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‘Since we have been a dialogue’: Blanchot’s
Entretiens
John McKeane
Much has it, since morning,
Since we have been a dialogue and have
been hearing one another,
Felt, mankind; but soon we shall be song.1
For a writer often taken to be withdrawn and obscure, Maurice
Blanchot started the new decade with a bang. In April 1960 he
contributed to theNouvelle revue française with ‘Interview on a Change
of Epoch’ (‘Entretien sur un changement d’époque’), his first text to be
written in dialogical form, and yet—on current estimates— the 534th
of his career. Numerous other dialogical pieces followed throughout
the early 1960s and then in the collection The Infinite Conversation
(L’entretien infini), ranging for instance from the short and sharp
exchanges of ‘Words Must Travel Far’ (‘Les paroles doivent cheminer
longtemps’) to the essayistic ‘Humankind’ (‘L’espèce humaine’), where
one interlocutor dominates, his or her interventions running to several
pages.2 Together these texts form a body of work that has been largely
bypassed by critics, who have instead taken the change in Blanchot’s
writing in this period to be synonymous with the fragmentation that
indeed went on to dominate his writing in the 1970s, having prevailed
over the dialogic texts alongside which it emerged.
Named entretiens in French, these texts present difficulties to
each of the English translations that might be attempted: ‘interview’
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privileges vision and the gaze in a way they directly oppose (one
is named ‘Speaking is not Seeing’ (‘Parler, ce n’est pas voir’)), and
‘conversation’ is too suggestive of togetherness when they often
underline misunderstanding and separation. The least bad translation
seems to be simply ‘dialogue’: and indeed we shall address Blanchot’s
relation to a central form of Western philosophy since Plato (the
proximity of this relation is surprising given his declared intent of
moving towards ‘a wholly other— and still unforeseeable— type of
affirmation’).3 Nonetheless, given that Blanchot chose not to use
the term ‘dialogue’, it is best simply to refer to entretiens, not least
because ‘dialogue’ privileges the actual words (via one of the more
literal meanings of logos), whilst these exchanges often take place
at and across the boundaries of language. We can thus repeat the
question that appears in one entretien: “‘but what is this voice?”’ (EI,
483 twice, 486). It can be read as showing unease at the opposing
interlocutor speaking words taken from Beckett, or as signalling that
the thread of argument has been lost, and perhaps the capacity to
hear too (might this be a dialogue de sourds?). These interjections
can therefore function both as local interruptions within a discursive
realm, and as more radical interruptions of that discourse itself.
Blanchot’s discussion of this distinction, to which we now turn, allows
us to understand to which questions the entretien might provide an
answer.
I. Two Kinds of Interruption
At first sight, we might be tempted to distinguish between between
dialogue as lying within logos or the realm of discursive language and
Blanchot’s entretiens as an exchange at times involving language and
at times pauses or gaps. However, we must look at the connotations
of dialogue more carefully than this distinction might suggest. Whilst
Blanchot does ultimately reject dialogue, in doing so he sets out
his relationship to its traditional epistemological suppositions in
instructive detail.4 For example, the text ‘Interruption (as on a Riemann
surface)’ (‘L’interruption (comme sur une surface de Riemann)’) sets
out how even a continuous dialogue must contain pauses, moments
where one interlocutor allows the other to speak, thus creating the
impression of fragmentation: ‘interruption is necessary for all successive
speech [suite de paroles]; intermittence makes becoming possible;
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discontinuity guarantees a continuity of understanding [entente]’
(EI, 107). But why should dialogue, a meeting of two interlocutors’
viewpoints and therefore at first sight an affair of plurality and
otherness, be concerned with unity? The answer is that dialogue itself
represents a reconciliation and relativisation of plural viewpoints— it
is not simply two, but two-in-one.5 Blanchot writes that ‘dialogue is
founded on reciprocity of speech and the equality of those speaking;
only two “I”s can establish a dialogical relation ; (. . .) each interlocutor
asserts himself as the equal of the other and sees in the latter another
“Me”. It is the paradise of decorous idealism’ (EI,114). In this light, to
concentrate on the superficial plurality of dialogue is to accept a model
of community between interlocutors that is dangerously self-present,
and whose engagement with otherness excludes anyone (or anything)
who (or which) has not already internalized the conventional language
of political agency.6
The article ‘Interruption’ goes on: ‘there is another type of
interruption which is more enigmatic and more weighty’ (EI, 108).
This second sort of interruption is said to be more demanding, as is
not recuperable by continuous discourse:
what is at stake and needs accounting for is everything that separates
me from the other, which is to say the other insofar as I am infinitely
separated from it [lui] ; this separation, fissure or interval leaves the
other infinitely outside me, but also aims to found my relation with
it [lui] on this very interruption, which is an interruption of being —
an alterity whereby it is, we must repeat, neither another ‘me’, nor
another existence (. . .), but the unknown in its infinite distance. (EI,
109; emphasis original)
This type of interruption is what Blanchot’s writing of entretiens seeks
to open towards; it is not a relative opening to the other, but an
absolute one. For him the other is by definition unavailable, not having
any stable identity, always being an other other. This leads to an
awareness of the difficulties that would be encountered were a model of
dialogue that simply represented the voice of the other to be proposed
(for instance as a way of widening political participation); or, in other
words, if the irruption of difference merely allowed dialectical business
as usual to be resumed. Regarding this possibility, Blanchot writes:
50 Oxford Literary Review
It is enough (. . .) to have heard the ‘dialogue’ between a man
who is supposedly innocent until proven guilty and the magistrate
interrogating him if we want to learn the meaning of equal speech
against a backdrop of an inequality of culture, condition, power,
chance [bonheur] ; however, at every moment each of us is either
a judge or in the presence of one ; all speech is commandment,
terror, seduction, resentment, flattery, machination ; all speech is
violence—and to aim to remain ignorant of this [prétendre l’ignorer]
within dialogue is to add liberal hypocrisy to the dialectical optimism
for which war is just one more mode of dialogue. (EI, 114)7
By referring here to Von Clausewitz’s statement that war is nothing
but the continuation of politics by other means, Blanchot signals his
wariness towards dialogue’s claim to overcome unspoken prejudice and
(self-)censorship. Similarly, he is wary of any representation of the other
that is wholly given over to the interests of any determined group:
his entretiens seek instead to stage an opening to the other’s voice
that remains neutral or indeterminate. This can be seen in an early
occurrence of the title that is given to the work that would appear in
1969: ‘In this infinite conversation [entretien infini], the other, side by
side with he who speaks tirelessly, is not really an other ; it is a double ;
it is not a presence but a shade, a vague possibility of understanding
[entente], the interchangeable, anonymous associate with whom no
society can be formed’.8 In other words, the voice of this other is not a
presence opposing or symmetrical to language. Indeed, it is perhaps not
even a voice at all (see the importance Blanchot’s political writing of the
1960s gives to ‘those who can not speak’), but rather the claim made by
whoever or whatever is disenfranchized from discursive language: the
silent demand of worklessness.9
Challengingly, these deferred or asymmetrical qualities of the second
type of interruption mean that it can not stand independently: instead
it must exist in and through the first type of interruption, in a second-
order way. This means that Blanchot’s gesture in beginning to write
the entretiens in question cannot be wholly identified with this second
interruption, as a benignly alternative mode of writing. Instead, much
of the tension that drives them stems from the constant negotiation
between a pause that serves to articulate a greater unity, and a pause
signalling that the thread of the argument is going astray (and thus
John McKeane 51
opening onto indeterminacy and plurality). As Blanchot writes, the
distinction between the two types of interruption may be ‘very firm
in theory’ (EI, 110); it is no less the case that in the messy business
of any given interaction, there is always ambiguity between the two.
‘[W]hen two people speak, the silence that allows them, as they
speak together, to speak in turn, is still only a first-order pause of
alternation, but also, already in this alternation we can find at work
the interruption that indicates the unknown’ (EI, 110–11). In other
words, the second type of interruption is at play in the interruptions
necessary in all discourse. This of course includes the dialogue format,
whether understood as one mode of writing amongst others, or—
raising the stakes for Blanchot’s gesture in beginning to write such
texts— as a privileged representative of epistemological inquiry in
general. Thus these entretiens, as reiterations of traditional dialogues,
stage the interaction between the two types of interruption, rather than
merely putting the case for the second type of interruption.
The dialectical movement of dialogues since Plato is a prime example
of this continuous discourse that is reinforced by the first type of
interruption and yet inflected by the second. But it is characteristic
of this totalizing or continuous discourse to comprehend other areas
too. I have chosen the epigraph from Hölderlin to illustrate this point:
that ‘we’ should ‘have been a dialogue’ brings out on the one hand a
notion of self-present human community, the two-in-one existing even
in apparent division (i.e. the multiplicity necessary for a dialogue to be
defined as such). On the other hand, it suggests a model of Western
history as continuous and as being driven by a dialogical or dialectical
impulse. This is an important reason why we cannot say that Blanchot’s
entretiens leave philosophy behind in a turn to a language that would
be completely non-thetic (were this to be possible in the first place).
The dialogue form that he adopts and adapts is after all the form par
excellence of philosophical argumentation, where the voice of the other
is incorporated as a stage leading to a more essential truth. On this
view, dialogue has been crucial for Western history understood as a
process of questioning and advancement. This sense emerges when
Blanchot compares Socrates’s speech with the dialogic voices present
in Malraux’s writing, describing the latter thus: ‘The time [temps] in
which one might come to agreement is lacking. The lull where the
divided spirit of time speaks comes to an end, and violence asserts
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itself anew’.10 The division present in ‘the divided spirit of time’ is
to be understood as the type of interruption that enables discourse to
articulate itself, to catch its breath before continuing on. Blanchot’s
aim in beginning to write entretiens is to explore the limit between
this continuous view and what escapes it: a time out of time that
Hölderlin mentions as ‘soon’, an impending yet suspended moment
that Blanchot calls ‘a change of epoch’. In these texts the positioning of
two or more interlocutors in relation to one another allows this limit
to be explored more concretely, with more precision, articulation, and
perhaps even neutrality than would be provided by a critical text. As we
shall see once some of the deconstructive context for Blanchot’s gesture
has been filled in, these characteristics mean that not only is the coming
of a ‘change of epoch’ announced by an entretien bearing that title, but
it is announced as lying beyond dominant discursive conceptions of
futurity.
II. Between Closure and Ending
We have begun to see that Blanchot’s entretiens stage a complex
relationship with continuous philosophical discourse, or what
Nietzsche calls ‘the Socratism of morality, the dialectics, modesty and
cheerfulness of theoretical man’.11 This relationship entails recognising
that to peremptorily dismiss or negate continuity is in fact to be
brought back within it dialectically: negation being the dialectical
modus operandi. What’s more, any engagement with a possible limit
to this continuity, as well as with the availability or otherwise of
any alternative mode of intervention, is likely to be a fraught one.
These aspects can be seen in the way in which many of the entretiens
begin: ‘Knowledge of the Unknown’ (‘Connaissance de l’inconnu’)
begins starkly with “‘What is a philosopher?”, and discussion is set
in motion by altering the canonical definition (“‘(. . .) someone who
feels astonishment (. . .)”’) to: “‘(. . .) someone who is afraid”’ (EI,
70). Similarly, at the outset of ‘Speaking is not Seeing’ interlocutor A
asks what B is looking for, to which no clear response comes, except
that this second interlocutor doesn’t know. When this ignorance is
attacked by A as being poisedly désinvolte, B counters that rather
than not going far enough, even such a profession of ignorance is
too presumptuous: Blanchot here is moving away from the Socratic
notion that philosophy begins in knowing what one does not know
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(a classically dialectical recuperation or setting-to-work of ignorance).12
These examples suggest that the discussions in Blanchot’s entretiens
are concerned less with treating a wide range of issues than with one
central question, or rather with the question of centrality itself: how the
Western epistemological tradition is altered by the ‘change of epoch’
that he addresses.
A striking and problematic aspect of Blanchot’s characterizations of
continuous discourse is how it is often identified with philosophy, by
which he means not such currents as phenomenology, but rather the
Western tradition of metaphysical idealism from Plato to Hegel. In
order to put these characterisations in their context, let us look at
various similar gestures made by deconstructive thinkers close to his
work. We can begin with Derrida, and a complex gesture concerning
the limit or closure of philosophy that is made in Of Grammatology.
Discussing in an interview the chapter ‘The End of the Book and the
Beginning of Writing’, Derrida states:
A page before the chapter bearing this title, a distinction was drawn
between closure [clôture] and ending [fin]. What is caught in de-
limited closure can continue indefinitely. So long as one reads more
than its title, this chapter announces precisely that the book has no
ending and writing has no beginning. Indeed, this chapter shows
that writing does not begin. Writing is even that from which, if you
like, we can call into question the search for archie, for an absolute
beginning, for an origin. Writing can therefore no more begin than
the book can end . . . 13
This gesture is complex because it is not, as the rhetoric of
deconstruction as an avant-garde would have us imagine, simply
a call to make a transgressive step beyond continuity. Thus
Derrida avoids naïvely imagining that any such step could be
definitively accomplished, or in other words that any écriture that was
programmatically championed could ultimately escape becoming in
its turn part of what is called the Book, meaning the metaphysical
or philosophical tendency towards continuity.14 If the Book cannot
come to an end, therefore, how can we distinguish deconstruction
from a quiestist acceptance of established discourse? The answer is to
be found in the distinction between closure and ending: whilst there
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is no empirical end to the dominion of the Book (and perhaps quite
the contrary, as we shall see), this dominion can nonetheless be said to
have come to a qualitative point of closure. The Book may continue to
exist, but there is no guarantee that it will remain open and responsive
to the singularity of the events that it recounts. What’s more, the same
interview also sees Derrida referring to the contemporary juncture in
the history of thought as a ‘moment when such an ending [of the book]
delimits itself’.15 In this description we can see a double gesture: on the
one hand to delimit this clôture (meaning in French closure, or more
literally a fence) means reinforcing it, ensuring that the entrenched
habits of continuous or logocentric discourse are unable to make their
return. On the other hand, I suggest that this delimitation can also be
a de-limitation, a removal of what had penned diverse thinkers into
one tradition. This gesture can be seen in the work Dis-Enclosure by
Derrida’s associate Jean-Luc Nancy: a dis-enclosure or a liberation of
thought.16 This second aspect of the deconstructive gesture concerning
philosophy as a continuous totality is also present in a letter from
Derrida to Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe concerning the polyphonically-
namedMimesis: des articulations volume, and proposing the removal of
a clôture/fence: ‘It seems necessary (. . .) to hustle/stir up the population
of theoreticians, make them run after the livestock as if one were
creating havoc in a cattle market or as if one were opening wide—
allow me to specify : towards the outside— the gates of an agricultural
fair’.17
The distinction between closure and ending is also adopted by
Lacoue-Labarthe: he writes that philosophy ‘has accomplished itself
[s’est accomplie]’ (being careful not to say that it ‘has completed itself
[s’est achevée])’, and that since Heidegger this ‘is well-known; it has
almost become a basic commonplace’.18 His account is particularly
useful because he sets out that not only does the closure of philosophy
not necessarily imply its ending, but that this closure exists in and
through the massive expansion of philosophy:
The accomplishment of philosophy signifies (. . .) that starting from
the moment when it verified and exhausted its programme (. . .),
philosophy, because this verification contained within it an immense
power— the being of what is being thinking [l’être de ce qui est
étant la pensée]: what can be represented, calculated, rationalized,
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transformed, etc.—philosophy, whether going by this name or
by those of Science or Knowledge which it claimed as its own,
generalized and universalized itself ; and, as a not solely empiricial
consequence, globalized itself [s’est mondialisée]. Henceforth the
philosophical dominates in a total way, in the form of modern
technology, and whatever the varying ideology (the ‘philosophy’)
whereby this domination is expresssed.19
In other words, the discourse of continuity is dominant to the
point that it has exceeded all previous yardsticks by which we might
have attempted to measure it. For Lacoue-Labarthe, the scale of this
dominance must be understood via the grip of continuity over history,
philosophy and human community, and at the same time via the
technological globalization that is at work in the modern world.
Indeed, not only are these factors at work within that world, but
they have created the space that is named thus (in the sense that the
world is an artificial construct, defined by its interconnectedness or
smallness, rather than being an empirical globe). In this light, Lacoue-
Labarthe writes elsewhere that ‘an age of the world, which is perhaps
the age of the world, is coming to its end due to the accomplishment,
closing off the horizon, of what since the Greeks the philosophical West
has named, in multiple ways, knowledge. Which is to say technè’.20
Thus not only is this tendency towards totalisation and globalisation
a contemporary phenomenon, but it also has roots stretching back
throughout the time during which, in Hölderlin’s words, ‘we have been
a dialogue’.
For its part, Blanchot’s writing at the turn of the 1960s
pays particular attention to technology— i.e. continuous discourse
manifested in technology—and its domination over or innervation of
Western(ized) societies. For instance, he writes on the first spacewalk
and its implications for the relationship between heavenly and earthly
power:
On his return, Gagarin cracked several poor jokes : he had been
to heaven and had not met God. The spokesmen of Catholicism
protested. They were wrong to do so. The profanation had indeed
taken place : the old heavens, the heavens of religions and of
contemplation, the sublime and pure heights, had been erased in
an instant, stripped of the privilege of inaccessibility and replaced by
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another absolute, that of space as it is comprehended by researchers,
which is nothing but a calculable possibility.21
The ‘nothing. . . but’ clause is significant here: despite the apparent
singularity and newness of this event, for Blanchot it only serves
to underline the domination of continuous discourse, of possibility,
knowledge, and calculation. However, this does not mean that he
is proposing a return to pre-technological modes of existence: the
closure of technology is also valuable insofar as it takes us beyond any
conception of pre-industrial existence, for instance the Romantic vision
of the non-alienated individual. Blanchot therefore neither proposes
a return to the past nor an acceptance of the future being offered
by continuity: and indeed his concept of what is neither. . . nor. . . ,
which therefore apes the negativity of dialectics without providing any
resolution, emerges here: it is named ‘the neuter’.22 An important field
of resonance for this thinking of the neuter can be found in how
entretiens stage difference on several levels: difference between voices,
difference between registers of voice, and difference between voice and
what cannot be voiced.
This is particularly the case in ‘Interview on a Change of Epoch’
(‘Entretien sur un changement d’époque’, renamed ‘On a Change of
Epoch’ in The Infinite Conversation), to which we can now return. This
text occupies a key place in his œuvre insofar as it opens the rich vein
of entretiens that are to follow—we could even call it programmatic
in this respect—, and because the change that it discusses has a
complex dual status. On the one hand this change proceeds from the
unparalleled extension of the dominance of continuous discourse, not
least through technology, and on the other hand this change represents
a second-order interruption of that continuity, a fragmentation
that remains singular, resistant to all narratives, including any self-
defeatingly predictable or durable narrative of change.
III. ‘Interview on a Change of Epoch’
The linking of historical, philosophical and technological continuity
takes us to the heart of Blanchot’s adoption of the entretien format, not
least in the case of this text with such relevance to his relationship with
change at a wider level. It wastes no time in coming to the topic named
by its declamatory title, the opening words reading:
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[A] ‘Will you allow this certainty : that we are at a turning-point ?’
[B] ‘If it is a certainty, it is not a turning point (. . .).’ (EI, 394)
This would have leapt out at attentive readers, for five years previously
the essay entitled ‘The Turning Point’ (‘Le tournant’) began with
the statement that ‘[w]e are at a turning-point’, and a few pages
later affirmed that ‘[m]ankind today must therefore turn around [se
retourner]’.23 Something striking is therefore at stake between the
two texts: the earlier one is being pointedly updated, despite its
already radical claims, by a fragmentation or evacuation of Blanchot’s
position as the author or critic responsible for the text. The entretien
therefore allows Blanchot to gather his previous text into a defined,
limited totality, before using the other voice to call that totality into
question.What’s more, interlocutor B calls for doubt and caution,
arguing that the continuous model of history is remarkably persistent,
in the face of A’s radical, eschatological position. Thus the hypothesis
of a change of epoch is questioned from the outset, even as Blanchot’s
writing mutates in response to it. Mutation and questioning go hand
in hand, as the logic of an ère du soupcon (age of suspicion) is rigorously
explored. Indeed, this questioning is such that the change of epoch
will ultimately not be identified in the entretien, despite the various
signs (nuclear weapons, other instances of technology’s dominance)
that point to it: the closest that we come to a definition of this change
is interlocutor A’s assertion that “‘(. . .) through the power of modern
technology an attack is being readied in comparison with which the
explosion of bombs seems unimportant”’ (EI, 403).
We have seen that Blanchot’s entretiens are concerned with the
notion of a totalizing mode of thought—particularly the heritage of
Plato— even as they attempt to bring out an asymmetrical, second-
order type of interruption. This entretien in particular deals with
the question of where this continuity might be criticized from,
i.e. whether there is any exterior position that is able to resist
assimilation into totality. In line with Hölderlin’s words which allow
us to think of history as one version of this continuity, possible
versions of such an exterior position can be seen when the text’s
interlocutor A (although he/she is not— even—named thus) states
“‘(. . .) Remember Herodotus who is often called ‘the father of history’.
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One enters his books as one enters a landscape on which morning
is shortly to break (. . .)”’ (EI, 395). The same interlocutor later
returns to an opposition between “‘(. . .) mythical-heroic times (. . .)”’,
represented by the hero Hercules and the bard of heroic deeds Homer,
and time understood as historical discourse. However, A underlines
how the historical model of time relies on the mythical model as a
useful counterpoint, even though they appear to be mutually exclusive:
“‘(. . .) historical man shares much with the myths of heroic times,
insofar as he asserts himself now by struggling against them, now
by identifying with them (. . .)”’ (EI, 401).24 This position is then
developed to the point where A declares that he/she is happy to see
the back of the model of time that declared itself to be historical but
in truth reproduced the violence of the mythical. In turn, B counters
with the argument that “‘You prefer instead the myth of the end of time
(. . .)”’ (EI, 402). A’s reply to this is: “‘It is not my business to indicate
a preference (. . .)”’, thus attempting to take matters beyond the realm
of the individual subject’s opinion and situating the debate at the limit
between historical time and something—anything— lying beyond it.
This question of the limit between a continuity bringing together
history, philosophy and community (the three elements being united
in the words ‘since we have been a dialogue’), and a fragmentation or
interruption lying beyond it, provides the terms in which Blanchot’s
text will approach its headline issue, the change of epoch. It spends
considerable time unpicking several eschatological hypotheses, notably
Ernst Jünger’s in On the Wall of Time (on the World-Spirit of the Atomic
Age) (1959) and those present in the work of theologian/paleontologist
Teilhard de Chardin. The merits of various such claims are weighed
and debated, with the debate coming to focus on the technological
developments of recent decades, more specifically nuclear weapons.
In this context, interlocutor A states as a development of his/her
eschatological argument that “‘(. . .) When, for the first time in the
history of the world, we possess the ability to put an end to this
history and to this world, it is because we have departed the realm
of history. The change of epoch has taken place (. . .)”.’ (EI 402)
In other words, the status of death and human finitude has been
radically altered by technology’s dominance, specifically by the advent
of nuclear weapons.The direct language, as if drawing on something
that was verifiable and in little doubt, is important here: the argument
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is not that a nuclear war would represent the onset of a new age,
but rather that the very possibility of this taking place, even as only a
possiblity, i.e. something that remains potential and suspended, means
that the change of epoch has already taken place. The all-powerfulness
of continuity (of technological knowledge and of the society that wields
it) is what is significant, together with the fact that nuclear-empowered
continuity falls outside any moral or ethical frameworks that might
have been equal to it.
But why should an entretien, that form strikingly adopted for the
first time on this text’s appearance in April 1960, be particularly
suited to Blanchot’s discussion of a change of epoch having been
accomplished by the dominance of technology? In addition to this
form’s general reiteration of dialogue (and with it the Western
philosophical tradition that we have seen key deconstructive thinkers
identifying with technology), the reason can be seen in this particular
text. Let us consider the relationship of interlocutor A’s eschatological
argument to interlocutor B’s historicist one: perhaps the most revealing
exchanges between the two immediately follows the intervention in
which A states that the invention of nuclear weapons means that “‘(. . .)
the change of epoch has taken place (. . .)”’:
‘[B] (. . .) Are you certain that it is the first time ? Perhaps you have
forgotten the Bible. Biblical man lives constantly in this situation
that you describe as new ; he has been warned by Jahweh that if
men persist in their habits, they will be exterminated and creation
will be abolished. History is born under this threat, it is the threat of
historical time itself.’
[A] ‘Back then the fire rained from on high. Now it is a creation
of the world.’ [vient d’en bas]
[B] ‘I could reply lightly that when God promises to annihilate
humanity if it continues to act badly, he leaves the latter a choice.
Everything always depends on mankind, whether there is God or
whether there is atomic science.’
[A] ‘Precisely, whether there is God or atomic science, not
everything depends on mankind (. . .)’ (402)
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Here B presents a synthetizing position that, whilst striking and
radical— the Bomb and God being presented as two instances of
a single phenomenon, namely mankind’s need to threaten itself
with extermination— is nonetheless dialectical, bringing two disparate
phenomena together into a more general category. It is then retained
by A, but raised to a new and opposing position in a classically
dialectical move. The hyperbolic, radical nature of this position
therefore confirms that dialectics is able to recalibrate and rearticulate
itself in relation to newness, i.e. it is concerned with the accounting
for change and singularity rather than with the conservative schemas
and pre-ordained categories of myth and mysticism. The necessity of
leaving this possiblity open will continue to influence many aspects of
Blanchot’s writing—not least in a later dialogue where an interlocutor
representing continuous discourse says to one representing radical
interruption: “‘(. . .) You torment me, it is true, even by leaving me
in peace, but I too can torment you: justice, truth, truth, justice, these
terms which you reject in your premature snickering pursue you in turn
(. . .)”’.25
It is crucial that Blanchot’s position on these issues not be confused
with the eschatological argument: such readings of him as an enigmatic
prophet-figure, a herald of some New Age, are merely a subset of
the equally misplaced argument that deconstruction is indifferent
to historical particularity and therefore to political justice. Indeed,
perhaps no strategy could allow him to disqualify such readings more
forcefully than beginning to write entretiens in which this position is
adopted by only one of two voices, and argued against by the other.
Here deconstruction’s complex gesture in relation to an écriture which
cannot begin and a continuous, totalizing book that cannot end—
despite and perhaps due to its closure—finds itself reflected and
refracted in illuminating ways. Ultimately, Blanchot’s entretiens allow
us to glimpse a writing of the many. This is not simply because they
contain two interlocutors, however: we saw above that this duality can
too easily be recuperated into a self-present, continuous community,
into the ‘we’ that for Hölderlin ‘have been a dialogue’. Instead, this
writing of the many is to be found in what Nancy, writing on Plato’s
dialogue Ion, calls ‘le partage des voix’.26 The partage in question (the
term of course means both a sharing-out and a division) takes place
between an extension or exposure, but not complete abandonment or
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peremptory dismissal, of dialectics, and on the other, a second-order
type of interruption whose generative-disseminative force was— is—
in being still to come.
Notes
1 From Friedrich Hölderlin’s ‘Celebration of Peace’, after Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe’s translation into French in L’animal, 19–20 (Winter 2008), 154.
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